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III. SALE OR EXCHANGE
A. In General
Long- and short-term capital gain and loss are defined by section
1222 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) as gain or loss from
the "sale or exchange" of a capital asset.' Fulfilling this sale or
exchange requirement is crucial, for without either a "sale" or an
"exchange," as opposed to some other form of disposition, the tax-
payer cannot realize a capital gain or loss.' It is not enough that a
certain transaction involves a capital asset; there must be a sale or
exchange of the capital asset. Moreover, gain or loss must arise
directly from a sale or exchange of the property itself, not merely
as an incident to the capital asset transaction. For example, in the
sale of real estate between B and C, the gain (or loss) realized by
A-who has no legal or equitable interest in the property-which
arises from his investment interest in any possible profits from the
sale of the property, may well be found to be merely incidental to
the "sale or exchange" of the capital asset. Thus, it would not be
subject to the beneficial capital gains tax rate.3
Since capital gains and losses are accorded special tax treatment,
determining whether a sale or exchange has occurred is vitally im-
portant. This generally creates no problem because the usual trans-
actions referred to as sales and exchanges ordinarily are easily iden-
tifiable. For several reasons, however, finding a proper label for
* Part One of this article, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1 (1979), analyzes the statutory requisites
of the capital gains provisions, the statutory and judicial exceptions which subsequently have
arisen, and related topics including stock attribution, depreciation recapture, and the conse-
quences of selling a business. Part Two concludes the article with an analysis of the sale or
exchange requirement, the holding period, and the mechanics of the tax.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this article are entirely those
of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recom-
mendations of the Joint Committee on Taxation, United States Congress.
** Legislative Attorney, Joint Committee on Taxation, United States Congress. A.B. 1971,
Villanova University; J.D. 1974, Loyola University (New Orleans); LL.M. 1975, Yale Univer-
sity. Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; the
United States District Court, N.J.; and the United States Tax Court.
1. I.R.C. § 1222.
2. See also Gallagher, Capital Gains and Losses: A Primer (Part One), 7 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Part One], section II.D., for a discussion of § 1231.
3. See, e.g., Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1967).
See also the discussion regarding the sale of contract rights in Part One, supra note 2, section
Il.J.
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some transactions can prove to be difficult. Not all relevant com-
mercial transactions are structured clearly as sales or exchanges.
And even though the structure may be clear from a commercial
standpoint, commercial practice and parlance is not always re-
flected in the Code.' The Code defines neither sale nor exchange in
relation to capital asset dispositions resulting in capital gain or loss.'
Additional complications arise from those Code provisions which
treat certain specified transactions as sales or exchanges for income
tax purposes even though they do not actually constitute commer-
cial sales or exchanges.' In other instances an admitted sale or ex-
change of a capital asset may fall within a Code provision expressly
requiring that no gain or loss be recognized.7 It is largely because of
the potential complications in questionable transactions that the
sale or exchange requirement must be examined.
Finally, it is important to note that despite the occasional prob-
lems encountered in dealing with the sale or exchange requirement,
its creation is not without justification. The sale or exchange re-
quirement is consistent with the theoretical basis for according spe-
cial tax treatment to capital gains. Once a capital asset is sold or
exchanged, the taxpayer has terminated his investment in that
property. Profit or loss arising from such a termination must be
distinguished from that profit which arises from the everyday opera-
tion of his business. It is this distinction-between investment and
ordinary business income-which justifies the imposition of the sale
or exchange requirement on capital asset transactions.
1. Sale, Exchange, or "Other Disposition"
Initially, the sale or exchange requirement of section 1222 must
4. See generally Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of Private
Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TUL. L. REV. 355 (1963); Scharf, State Law in the Tax
Court-Controlling Precedents, 26 TAx LAW. 293 (1973); Stephens & Freeland, The Role of
Local Law and Local Adjudications in Federal Tax Controversies, 46 MINN. L. REv. 223
(1961); see also Blankenheimer, Tax Consequences of Rescission: The Interplay Between
Private and Public Law, 42 U. Cm. L. REv. 562 (1975).
5. Generally, one must distinguish between "sale" and "exchange" only in those instances
involving exchanges where the Code provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1034.
6. See generally Del Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001:
The Tax Event, Amount Realized and Related Problems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 219
(1977); see also section 1II.H. infra.
7. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121 (one-time exclusion from gross income of up to $100,000 in gain
from the sale or exchange of a residence by persons 55 or older); § 351 (no gain or loss
recognized if property is exchanged for stock, resulting in control of the corporation); § 1031
(no recognition of income for in-kind exchanges of certain property to be used for identical
purposes); § 1034 (no recognition of gain on sale of residence if a new one is purchased within
18 months).
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be compared with the section 1001 requirement of a "sale or other
disposition."8 Under section 1222 a taxpayer can have capital gain
or loss upon a "sale or exchange" of the property involved. Under
section 1001(2), on the other hand, ordinary gain or loss is realized
upon the "sale or other disposition" of property. Section 1001(c), the
recognition provision, provides that all gain or loss (as computed
according to section 1001(2)) on the "sale or exchange" of property
shall be recognized for income tax purposes. The basic theory under-
lying section 1001 is that a taxpayer will not be taxed until he has
severed to a sufficient degree his interest in property.' Why Congress
used both "sale or exchange" and "sale or other disposition" in this
seemingly contradictory manner is uncertain. However, the two
phrases are apparently not coextensive. A property transfer may be
a disposition without being a sale or exchange. For example, it has
been held that the satisfaction of a judgment by the judgment
debtor is a "disposition" of property by the judgment holder; 0 yet,
the transaction does not involve a "sale or exchange" on which
capital gain or loss will be realized. Accordingly, ordinary gain or
loss must be recognized.
Rarely will there be a problem determining whether a certain
disposition of property also constitutes an exchange; nevertheless,
the precise difference between "sale or exchange" and "sale or other
disposition" is not entirely clear. Though section 1001 uses both of
these phrases, it usually is interpreted to include all closed transac-
tions. The Treasury Regulations (the Regulations) define a sale as
a transfer of property for a "money consideration" and an exchange
as a "reciprocal transfer of property."" Although the Code does not
define sale or exchange, the Supreme Court has said that these
terms should be given their "ordinary meaning."'" Certain other
8. See generally Hacker, What Is a "Sale or Exchange"?, 12 W. RES. L. REV. 253 (1961);
Hellawell, Making the Disposition a Sale or Exchange, 12 W. RES. L. REV. 271 (1961); Com-
ment, Income Tax-Construction of "Sale or Exchange" Clause-Section 117, 1954 U. ILL.
L.F. 340.
9. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 3 A.F.T.R. 3020 (1920). See also Zarky, Capital
Gain Concepts: What is a "Capital" Asset? When Is There a "Sale or Exchange"?, in
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW ELEVENTH ANNUAL TAX INSTITUTE 357, 365
(J. Ervin ed. 1959). It has been posited that a combination of Eisner's requirement of a
"severence" to realize "income" with the sixteenth amendment's tax on "incomes" suggests
that taxing unrealized gain may be unconstitutional. J. JACOBS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
FEEDING THE HUNGRY BEAST 425-27 (4th ed. 1978).
10. Herbert's Estate v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 756, 31 A.F.T.R. 1133 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 752 (1943). See also Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 19 A.F.T.R.2d
514 (5th Cir. 1967); Hellawell, supra note 8.
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d) (1957).
12. Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 790 (1965); Helvering v.
William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249, 25 A.F.T.R. 1236 (1941). See also
Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. 496, 17 A.F.T.R. 470 (1936); McFeeley
1979]
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courts-notably the Fifth Circuit- 13 have struggled to distinguish
between sales, exchanges, and dispositions, but their efforts have
not resulted in any definitive clarification.
The lack of a precise definition has lead to some confusion. For
example, where the courts determine that a particular transaction
with a capital asset is not a "sale or exchange," they may be holding
that the transaction is not closed or completed, rather than deciding
whether the taxpayer's gain or loss is capital or ordinary." Here the
capital gain and loss provisions would not apply because there was
no "sale or other disposition" under section 1001(a) and not because
there was no "sale or exchange" within the meaning of section 1222.
Thus the taxpayer could not offset his basis against the amount
received because the transaction is not closed. For example, if a
purported sale is found to be a lease, the taxpayer's receipts will be
taxed as ordinary income, offset by depreciation, even though the
property may be a capital asset. Here it is more accurate to hold
that there has been no "sale or other disposition," for to state that
the transaction is not a "sale or exchange" may imply, incorrectly,
that it is a "sale or other disposition" which fails to qualify for
capital gain or loss treatment only because it does not meet the more
rigorous requirements of a "sale or exchange."
2. Some Common Examples
A sale or exchange can take many forms, depending on the factual
setting of the transaction. The discussion in this section will center
on some of those common dispositions of property whose status as
either sales or exchanges is largely settled. Subsequent sections of
this article will discuss other types of transactions whose tax conse-
quences are less predictable.
A debtor's transfer of property in satisfaction of a claim is a sale
of the property. 5 Satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest with appre-
ciated property is a sale or exchange of that property, since it dis-
charges the taxpayer's obligation." So, too, is a spouse's transfer of
v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 16 A.F.T.R. 965 (1935); Hellawell, supra note 8; Income
Tax- Construction of "Sale or Exchange" Clause-Section 117, supra note 8.
13. See Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1967).
14. On "open" transactions, see, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 9 A.F.T.R. 1453
(1931); Inaja Land Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 727 (1947).
15. Riley v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 932, 939-41 (1962), af'd 328 F.2d 428, 13 A.F.T.R.2d
654 (5th Cir. 1964). See also Peninsula Properties Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 84 (1942);
Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214.
16. See, e.g., Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217, 25 A.F.T.R. 607 (2d Cir. 1940);
Brinckerhoff v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1045 (1947), aff'd, 168 F.2d 436, 440, 36 A.F.T.R. 1067
(2d Cir. 1948). See also Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 C.B. 325, modified, Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1
C.B. 286.
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appreciated property in satisfaction of a release of support and mar-
ital rights in a divorce proceeding." However, where the purchaser
of a judgment enters into a settlement with the debtor there is no
sale or exchange, at least so far as the purchaser is concerned, even
though he realizes a gain.'8 Thus, ordinarily a distinction is drawn
between the debtor and the creditor; but a transfer by a creditor for
consideration to a third party usually will be treated as a sale."
Where mortgaged property is sold through a foreclosure, 0 or
transferred by a deed in lieu of foreclosure,2 the transaction is
treated as a sale or exchange.2 2 But where the mortgagor voluntarily
conveys the mortgaged property to the mortgagee in satisfaction of
the obligation, the tax consequences will depend on whether the
mortgagor is liable personally for the obligation. The transfer will
be treated as a sale or exchange only where the mortgagor is person-
ally liable on the mortgage.1 The rationale underlying this distinc-
tion is simply that in the case of a personally liable mortgagor the
discharged debt is something of value received by him, namely, the
shedding of a liability. Without personal liability the mortgagor
receives nothing-which could warrant conversion of a discharge into
an exchange.24 However, even where the debtor is without personal
liability, if he receives additional consideration, such as cash, on the
voluntary conveyance, the transfer may be found to be an ex-
change.25
The treatment of the release of contract rights has had a che-
quered history, both because a release was construed to be outside
the meaning of a "sale"2 and because the question of whether a sale
17. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1625 (1962). But see, Gallagher, A
New Look at the Income Tax Consequences of a Property Division Incident to a Divorce, 1
REV. TAX. INDIVIDUALS 9 (1977).
18. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 295, 44 A.F.T.R. 182 (D. Neb. 1953);
Hudson v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 734 (1953), aff'd sub nom. Ogilvie v. Commissioner, 216
F.2d 748, 46 A.F.T.R. 1089 (6th Cir. 1954); accord Riddell v. Scales, 406 F.2d 210, 23
A.F.T.R.2d 69-541 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the
Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REV. 225 (1959); Wilson,
Taxation of Debt Collection and Cancellation, 48 CAL. L. REV. 623 (1960).
19. See, e.g., Paine v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 398, 50 A.F.T.R. 10 (8th Cir. 1956).
20. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 24 A.F.T.R. 1082 (1941).
21. Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214.
22. See generally Handler, Tax Consequences of Mortgage Foreclosures and Transfers of
Real Property to the Mortgagee, 31 TAX L. REv. 193 (1976).
23. Compare Commissioner v. Green, 126 F.2d 70, 28 A.F.T.R. 1286 (3d Cir. 1942) with
Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335, 28 A.F.T.R. 656 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Rev. Rul. 76-
111, 1976-1 C.B. 214; Handler, supra note 22.
24. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14, 35 A.F.T.R. 776 (1947); Rev. Rul. 76-111,
1976-1 C.B. 214.
25. See, e.g., Blum v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 447, 30 A.F.T.R. 929 (2d Cir. 1943).
26. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344, 1 A.F.T.R. 2d 874 (2d Cir. 1958).
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was present frequently merged with whether the contract right was
a capital asset.? More recent decisions first examine the contract
right released; if it is a capital asset, the release is then treated as a
sale .21
Where the taxpayer grants a property interest to another in return
for contingent payments linked to the grantee's use, sales produc-
tion, or some similar standard, the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service) have been concerned both with whether the
interest granted was a capital asset and with whether the transfer
was part of a sufficiently completed transaction to be treated as a
sale or exchange.29 Generally the transfer of an exclusive interest in
a copyright or patent for the remainder of its life is recognized as a
"sale" even though payment is made via royalties contingent on
use, sales, or a similar standard.3 0 However, the transfer of an inter-
est restricted to a field of use (a geographical area smaller than the
licensing country) or for a duration less than its useful life is likely
to be found to be a license, not a sale.3' In contrast, the transfer of
the right to extract minerals from a taxpayer's land will be treated
as a sale, if the parties characterize it as such, even though it is
limited to an area or the consideration is based on extraction 2"
Under the terms of a commercial lease the tenant usually is obli-
gated to return the property to the landlord in the same condition
as it was at the beginning of the lease term. Alternatively, the lessee
may have the option to pay to have the premises restored to their
prior condition.3 3 Such restoration payments have been treated in-
consistently, either as additional rent or as payments for the "sale"
See generally Del Cotto, "Property" in the Capital Asset Definition: Influence of "Fruit and
Tree," 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1965).
27. See Part One, supra note 2, section lI.J.
28. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1651 (2d Cir. 1962);
Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX
L. REV. 1 (1964). A forfeited deposit, however, still remains ordinary income to the recipient.
Mittleman v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 171 (1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 1393, 30 A.F.T.R.2d 72-5574
(3d Cir. 1972); Smith v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 273 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 418 F.2d 573,
24 A.F.T.R.2d 69-6020 (9th Cir. 1969). Compare the tax treatment accorded on the lapse of
an option at section HI.H.5. infra.
29. See sections III.C.,H.6.,H.1O. infra.
30. See Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408.
31. See sections llI.C.,H.6.,H.1O. infra.
32. Compare Dann v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 499 (1958) and Collins v. Commissioner, 56
T.C. 1074 (1971) with Ellis v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1079 (1971), rev'd without opinion, 478
F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1973). See also section Ill.H.7. infra.
33. Compare Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 38 A.F.T.R. 1512 (10th Cir.
1950) with Royal St. Louis, Inc. v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5950 (E.D. La. 1976). See
generally Salter & McGowan, Tax Treatment of Payment to Lessor in Lieu of Restoration:
What Sirbo Holdings, Inc., Will Decide, 2 J. REAL EST. TAX. 145 (1975); Salter & McGowan,
What Sirbo Holdings Decided: A Postscript, 2 J. REAL. EST. TAX. 459 (1975); see also Kem
v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 961, 26 A.F.T.R.2d 70-5541 (9th Cir. 1970).
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of the altered property.34 Treating the restoration payments as pro-
ceeds from the sale of a capital asset is the more appropriate ration-
ale since there is no obligation to pay extra amounts unless the
property itself is damaged or altered. Thus the restoration payments
are in the nature of capital expenditures, not substitutes for rental
income.
Although restoration payments may be treated as sale proceeds,
abandonment losses do not qualify as sales or exchanges. 5 Simi-
larly, purchase deposits that are forfeited prior to a closing do not
represent gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. :"
If the default occurs after the sale, however, and the seller reac-
quires the property, the gain will be capital gain from a sale or
exchange. 7
The greatest amount of difficulty with the sale or exchange re-
quirement exists where a transaction has some features of a sale and
some attributes of another type of transfer. This especially is true
when the transaction has the characteristics of a sale in addition to
those of a gift, a license, a loan, or a lease, or when a transaction
takes the form of either a bootstrap sale or a transfer with a lease-
back. These transactions are considered below.
B. Sale or Gift
Transactions frequently embrace some characteristics of both a
sale and a gift. One instance in which the Service contends that the
transaction comprises a sale, and not a gift, is where the amount of
the gift tax paid by the donee exceeds the donor's basis in the
transferred property. In this situation the Service argues that the
excess of the gift tax over basis is taxable gain when the tax is paid.
The nature of the gain is characterized by the property in the
34. See Sirbo Holdings Inc. v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 981, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-1005 (2d Cir.
1973), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1220, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-568 (2d Cir. 1975); Billy Rose's Diamond
Horseshoe, Inc. v. United States, 448 F.2d 549, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5563 (2d Cir. 1971) (rent);
Boston Fish Market Corp. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 884 (1972) (sale); Bartlett, Tax Treat-
ment of Replacements of Leased Property and of Leasehold Improvements Made by a Lessee,
30 TAX LAW. 105 (1976); Salter & McGowan, supra note 33 at 145, 459. Where 1.R.C. § 109,
which excludes from gross income the value to the lessor of improvements made by a lessee,
is operative, the lessor's basis is not increased, and any gain on a sale must be increased by
such improvements.
35. See Commissioner v. Hoffman, 117 F.2d 987, 26A.F.T.R. 486 (2d Cir. 1941) (abandon-
ment of real property); Rev. Rul. 57-503, 1957-2 C.B. 139 (abandonment of personal prop-
erty). See also Beck v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 126 (1949); Friedman v. Commis-
sioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 382 (1943).
36. United States Freight Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 887, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-670 (Ct.
Cl. 1970); Smith v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 273 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 418 F.2d 573, 24
A.F.T.R.2d 69-6020 (9th Cir. 1969).
37. Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363 (1965).
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donor's hands.38 A similar position is espoused by the Service where
the donor mortgages the property in an amount greater than its
basis, makes the transfer subject to the mortgage, and pays the gift
tax with the loan proceeds. Both of these arguments are predicated
on the fact that the donor has realized a cash or in-kind benefit
greater than the basis of the transferred property. Both have re-
ceived mixed degrees of success.39 But one instance where the gov-
ernment's argument carries more weight arises when a donor trans-
fers property to a trust which then sells the property to pay the gift
tax. The added authority for taxing the donor in this situation is
section 677, since capital gains realized by the trust are used to pay
the gift tax.10
On the whole, however, the distinctions drawn by the courts be-
tween a sale and a gift are neither satisfactory nor consistent. And,
in fact, the courts have recognized the problem: "Whether a donor
realizes taxable income upon payment of the resulting gift taxes by
the donee or out of the transferred assets is a matter that has been
the subject of a tortuous course of decision, characterized by subtle-
ties and fine distinctions." 4' For example, in the typical "net gift"
transaction the donor conveys property to a trust which then must
pay the gift tax. If the tax is paid, and thereafter the property is
disposed of, there generally will be no income to the donor; however,
if the sequence is reversed the donor very well may be found to have
sold the property in part.42
In Turner v. Commissioner the donor made nine gifts of low basis
securities: three to named individuals outright and six in trust.13
38. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-1102 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), a/I'd, 572 F.2d
427, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-552 (4th Cir. 1978); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), a/I'd,
410 F.2d 752, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-1352 (6th Cir. 1969). See also Bacas, Gifts of Property Subject
to Indebtedness: Johnson v. Commissioner, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86 (1975).
39. See generally sources cited supra note 38; see also First Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 404 F.2d 1182, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-332 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969);
Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), aff'd per curiam, 469 F.2d
694, 31 A.F.T.R.2d 73-460 (5th Cir. 1972).
40. I.R.C. § 677(a) states "[tihe grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of
a trust . . . whose income without the approval or consent of any adverse party is . . . (1)
distributed to the grantor or [his] spouse .... " See, e.g., Estate of Sheaffer v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 99 (1961), af/'d, 313 F.2d 738, 11 A.F.T.R.2d 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 818 (1963); Estate of Staley v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 260 (1942), a//'d, 136 F.2d 368,
31 A.F.T.R. 158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 786 (1943); cf. Estate of Morgan v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 981 (1962), af/'d, 316 F.2d 238, 11 A.F.T.R.2d 1231 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 825 (1963) (not taxable to donor because donee had become personally liable).
41. Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 310 (1974), a/f'd, 572 F.2d 427, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-
552 (4th Cir. 1978).
42. For a discussion of this point, see Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307, 310-13 (1974),
a//'d, 572 F.2d 427, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-552 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Bacas, supra note 38.
43. 49 T.C. 356 (1968), a/I'd, 410 F.2d 752, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-1352 (6th Cir. 1969).
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Each transfer required the recipient to pay the resulting gift tax.
The three individual donees fulfilled their obligation with available
cash or the proceeds from the sale of the securities; the six trusts
obtained the funds to meet their portion of the tax by a combination
of loans, current income, and the sale of some of the donated stock.
The Commissioner argued that each transfer was part sale and part
gift, with the excess of the gift tax paid over the donor's basis consti-
tuting capital gain to the donor. Probably because of the small
amount of trust income involved, the government did not invoke
section 677. The court concluded that the transfer was a net
gift-the value of the shares less the gift tax-a transaction without
income tax consequences to the donor.44
However, where the transfer was structured somewhat differently,
the taxpayer was found to have realized a capital gain. In Johnson
v. Commissioner,45 the taxpayer owned securities with a fair market
value of over $500,000 and a basis of about $11,000. With the securi-
ties as collateral he obtained a $200,000 nonrecourse loan and then
transferred the securities to a trust. The trustees substituted their
note for the donor's, still secured by the stock. The donor used about
$150,000 of the loan to pay the gift tax, leaving him with $50,000
and no obligation on the note. The court held that the transfer was
part sale and part gift, with the donor realizing a capital gain meas-
ured by the excess of the loan over his basis in the securities. The
court found the crucial factor to be the absence of any obligation for
the donor to use the borrowed money to pay the tax.
Similarly, in Malone v. United States" the taxpayer transferred
to a trust, property in which he had a basis of $13,650; its fair
market value was approximately $57,000, and it was subject to a
$32,000 indebtedness. The court held that the transfer was part sale
and part gift because the donor received a pecuniary benefit from
the assumption of the indebtedness by the trust. The gain was the
excess of the debt over the basis. The court did not consider the
government's contentions that gain should be recognized regardless
of whether the indebtedness was assumed by the transferee.
The question of whether a transfer was a gift or a sale was also
considered in First National Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner."7
There the corporate taxpayer pledged stock in which it had a
$100,000 basis as collateral for a loan of $750,000 from an unrelated
44. 49 T.C. at 363.
45. 59 T.C. 791 (1973), a/I'd, 495 F.2d 1079, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-1102 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
46. 326 F. Supp. 106, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-1565 (N.D. Miss. 1971), a/I'd 455 F.2d 502, 29
A.F.T.R.2d 72-501 (5th Cir. 1972).
47. 404 F.2d 1182, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-332 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1014 (1969).
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party. The amount of the loan equaled the fair market value of the
shares. After securing the loan the taxpayer gave the pledged stock
to its parent, a nonprofit charitable corporation. The parent, in
turn, sold the stock and pledged the note that it received as security
for the taxpayer's indebtedness. After a series of intercorporate
transfers, the taxpayer's obligation was discharged. At no time dur-
ing the year of transfer did the parent hold the transferred property
free from the donor's obligation. The court ruled that the taxpayer
realized a capital gain which had to be recognized in the year of the
transfer because the transaction was "basically equivalent to a
sale.""
These cases indicate clearly that there are few bright lines for
determining whether a transfer is a sale, a gift, or part sale and part
gift. Where the transferees discharge the donor's obligation from
trust income without being required to do so, or where the transferor
encumbers the property without recourse prior to the conveyance
and transfers it subject to that indebtedness, the courts are likely
to find the transaction to be a part sale. Perhaps the only way to
avoid income-producing "gifts" is to track carefully the successful
taxpayers and to skirt the arrangements of the unsuccessful liti-
gants ."
C. Sale or License
Determining whether there has been a sale or a license of a prop-
erty interest is one of the most common and important tax problems
facing the parties to a transfer of rights to a patent, franchise, trade-
mark, or trade name. " Where these interests are involved a license
can easily be characterized as a sale, in which case the transferor
ordinarily will realize capital gain or loss. 5' Conversely, where the
licensing agreement is too restrictive or limiting, or where the trans-
feror has retained substantial interests in, or rights over, the trans-
ferred property, the licensor will realize ordinary income. 2 The crux
of the problem is to cut through the boilerplate complexity of the
48. 404 F.2d at 1186.
49. See also section III.E. infra for a discussion of the related area of bootstrap sales.
50. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 503, 52 A.F.T.R. 1092 (10th
Cir. 1957). See generally Hall & Smith, Franchising Under the Tax Reform Act., 4 IND. LEGAL
F. 305 (1970).
In the case of trade secrets and secret formulae, the dividing line between a sale and a
license has been drawn by some courts according to whether the buyer is restrained from
disclosing the secret. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d
904, 7 A.F.T.R.2d 1107 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Graham v. United States, 43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-1013 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
51. See Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408.
52. Cory v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 941, 49 A.F.T.R. 379 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
828 (1956).
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typical licensing agreement and to determine whether it conveys
merely a right to use the property in question.
1. Section 1253
Congress enacted section 1253 as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969. -I This section governs the tax treatment, to both the transferor
and the transferee, of amounts paid for the transfer of a trade name,
trademark, franchise, or distributorship. 5 The transferor of a sec-
tion 1253 asset is considered not to have sold or exchanged a capital
asset if he has retained "any significant power, right, or continuing
interest" over it. 55 Under section 1253(b)(2)(F) such a retained
power, right, or interest encompasses the "right to payments contin-
gent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the [trade name],
if such payments constitute a substantial element under the trans-
fer agreement." Treasury Regulation section 1.1253-2(d) (6) provides
that a significant power, right, or continuing interest includes:
A right to payments contingent on the productivity, use, or dis-
position of the subject matter of the transferred interest where the
estimated amount of such payments constitutes more than 50 per-
cent of the total estimated amount the transferee has agreed to pay
the transferor in consideration for the transfer . . .
The Regulations further elaborate upon the definition of a
"significant power, right or continuing interest" by explaining that
the phrase includes the right to participate in the transferee's adver-
tising activities. However, the enumeration of "significant rights"
contained in section 1253(b)(2), and the more extensive list set forth
in Treasury Regulation section 1.1253-2(d), is not exclusive. 7
Where the transferor has retained a "significant right or continu-
ing interest" in the trade name, all contingent payments made by
the transferee may be deducted under section 162(a) as ordinary
and necessary business expenses." The Regulations define
"contingent payments" to include "continuing payments, other
than installment payments of a principal sum agreed upon in the
transfer agreement, measured by a percentage of the selling price
53. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
54. See generally Hall, Tax Aspects of Franchising Operations, in TULANE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW TWENTIETH ANNUAL TAX INSTITUTE 102 (H. Fuller ed. 1971); Comment, The
Dairy Queen Cases: A Suggested Approach to the Taxation of Franchise Sales, 34 U. Cm. L.
REV. 884 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Taxation of Franchise Sales].
55. I.R.C. § 1253(a).
56. (1971).
57. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 209, 210 reprinted in [19691 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2244. See generally Reich, A Planning Guide to Franchise Transfers
in Light of Treasury's Proposed Regs., 36 J. TAX. 232 (1972).
58. I.R.C. § 1253(d)(1).
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of the products marketed, or based on the units . . . sold . . . .
Conversely, the licensor will realize a capital gain or loss where the
only right retained is to contingent payments where they are not a
"substantial element" of the total estimated payments. 0 To be less
than a substantial part of the estimated consideration, the contin-
gent payments must be expected to be fifty percent or less of the
total payments.'
The legislative history of section 1253 indicates that, contrary to
prior law, the transferred asset need not have a reasonably ascer-
tainable useful life in the transferee's hands in order to be deduct-
ible. 2 Moreover, section 1253 explicitly provides that even where a
principal sum is stated in the agreement and is to be paid in install-
ments, the payments are deductible by the transferee in accordance
with the rules of that section; provided, of course, there has not been
a sale or exchange (i.e., a significant power has been retained)."
Thus, section 1253 allows payments made for the outright acquisi-
tion of a trade name to be deductible. Additionally, Senate Report
91-552 makes it clear that the transferee should be given the benefit
of any doubt as to the deductibility of royalty payments. 4
Section 1253 does not provide a statutory calculus of factors, any
given number of which will transform a license into a sale. Instead,
all the circumstances surrounding the transfer must be considered,
and almost any single factor could be determinative in a given situa-
tion.65 The more rights that are retained by the licensor, the greater
the tendency to cast the agreement as a license.
2. Section 1235
Many of the elements used to characterize trade name and fran-
chise transfers also are used to determine whether a patent license
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-2(e) (1971).
60. Id.
61. See id. § 1.1253-2(d) (6).
62. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 57, at 208, 210. Cf. Dunn v. United States, 400 F.2d
679, 22 A.F.T.R.2d 5653 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding that no deductions could be taken because
the asset transferred had no reasonably ascertainable useful life); Graham v. United States,
43 A.F.T.R.2d 79-1013 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (the sale of the secret formula for "liquid paper" to
a § 1239 corporation did not preclude capital gains treatment because the formula had no
ascertainable useful life and was, therefore, not property subject to the allowance for depre-
ciation).
63. I.R.C. § 1253(d)(2); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-1(c)(3) (1971).
64. S. REP. No. 91-552, supra note 57. See also, J. BIsCHEL, TAXATION OF PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS, COPYRIGHTS, AND KNOW-How 5-8, 5-9 (1974).
65. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-2(d) (1971). See also Hall, supra note 54; Taxation of Fran-
chise Sales, supra note 54.
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is a sale." License agreements frequently are used in conjunction
with contingent payments to transfer patents. Often licenses are
chosen because they allow the value of the patent to be measured
by appropriate devices, such as use, sales, production, or some other
similar standard.
A patent holder will realize capital gain only on the transfer of an
undivided interest in or "all substantial rights" to a patent." A
patent license may be exclusive, nonexclusive, sole, or subject to
particular restrictions such as geographic, field of use, or time. An
exclusive license-one limited only to the country of the patent
grant-ordinarily will be characterized as a sale." The transfer of
less inclusive interests may raise questions of whether "all substan-
tial rights" have been transferred.7 0 The Regulations state that the
licensor may retain legal title to assure payment or performance."
Moreover, he may reserve a security interest, a right of forfeiture
upon nonperformance, or any right which is "not inconsistent with
the passage of ownership." 7 2 Retention of prohibitions on sub-
licensing, assignment, use, or sale may help to characterize the
transfer as either a sale or a license.7 3
The Regulations provide that a license does not grant "all sub-
stantial rights" to a patent. Therefore, a transaction will constitute
a license, and not a sale, when the transfer is limited either geo-
graphically within the country of issuance or for a period less than
66. See generally Hagen, Are Capital Gains Still Available Via Patent Fragmentation? A
Current Analysis, 43 J. TAX. 78 (1975); Morreale, Patents, Know-How and Trademarks: A
Tax Overview, 29 TAX LAW. 553 (1976).
67. See Part One, supra note 2, section I.D.; I.R.C. § 1235(a)(1), (2); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954). See also Rogers, Transfer of Patent Rights, 61 A.B.A.J. 374
(1975).
68. I.R.C. § 1235(a); see Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(a), (b) (1957).
69. See Busse v. United States, 543 F.2d 1321, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5984 (Ct. Cl. 1976);
Estate of Klein v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 617, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-457 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-381
(6th Cir. 1971); Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976); Mros v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 519 (1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d 813, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-996 (9th Cir. 1974); S. REP. No. 1622,
supra note 67, at 438.
70. See generally Part One, supra note 2, section I.D.; see also Blake v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 7 (1976) and the discussion of the cases therein.
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(i) (1957).
72. Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(2)(ii); cf. id. § 1.1235-1(b) (If a transfer is not one described in
§ 1235(a), then § 1235 has no applicability in determining whether the transfer is the sale or
exchange of a capital asset. Thus, a transfer by a person who is not a patent holder, or by a
holder to a related party, is not covered by § 1235.). See also Part One, supra note 2, section
I.D.; Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976).
Naturally, the rationale behind allowing the holder to retain such rights is to assure that
the patent will be utilized. See S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 67, which refers to the holder's
"monopoly rights evidenced by a patent."
73. Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976); see Tress. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(3) (1957). See
generally Hagen, supra note 66.
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the duration of its remaining life. Similarly, a license exists where
the grant conveys less than all rights under a field of use agreement
or fewer than all the claims covered by the patent.7 5 Where the
licensor has the right to terminate the agreement at will, the Regu-
lations accordingly provide that no sale has occurred. These restric-
tions are considered to be inconsistent with the grant of an undi-
vided interest in a patent.76
Despite the position of the Regulations, the courts have not been
uniform in sustaining their validity and have not given retained
rights the same weight as has the Service. 7 So long as the interest
retained by the licensor has any significant value at the time of the
agreement, the courts probably will uphold the government's posi-
tion that geographic or field of use restrictions transfer merely a
right to use the patent. 78
D. Sale or Loan
Just as a purported sale may be determined to be a gift, a license,
or a lease, a transfer may be a sale in form but a loan in substance. 7
Generally, loan proceeds, as distinguished from sale proceeds, are
not taxed.80 A sale where the transferor retains the right to reacquire
the property may be treated as a secured loan and therefore not as
a taxable disposition. Frequently this may occur in connection with
a refinancing of property. For example, in Blake v. Commissioner"'
the taxpayer prevented a mortgage foreclosure by transferring the
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i), (ii) (1957).
75. Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(iii), (iv); cf. Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976) (the court
found that one field of use grant satisfied § 1235, but that another did not meet its terms).
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(4) (1957). Where the patent holder has retained such a right,
it cannot be argued realistically that "all substantial rights to a patent... which are of value
at the time [of the transfer]" have been conveyed. Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1). The retention of such
a right is inconsistent with the transfer of the holder's "monopoly" rights to the patent.
77. See Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976), and the decisions discussed therein.
Generally, the Tax Court has been more liberal in its interpretation of § 1235 than have other
courts.
78. See, e.g., Blake v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 7 (1976). There has been much discussion
in the cases as to what constitutes "value," and whether § 1235 can be satisfied where such
rights may be held by other than the grantor of the patent rights. Cf. Mros v. Commissioner,
493 F.2d 813, 816, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-996 (9th Cir. 1974) ("known value"); Fawick v. Commis-
sioner, 436 F.2d 655, 663, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-381 (6th Cir. 1971) ("substantial value"), E. 1.
duPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 432 F.2d 1052, 1055, 26 A.F.T.R.2d 70-5636 (3d
Cir. 1970) ("substantial value"); Bell Intercontinental Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 1004,
1015, 20 A.F.T.R.2d 5153 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("little tangible value").
79. See generally 3B J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.93 at 652
(J. Malone ed. 1973).
80. But see Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 33 A.F.T.R.2d 74-1102 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974) (loan proceeds were used to pay the donor's gift tax when
he transferred the property).
81. 8 T.C. 546 (1947).
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mortgaged property to the mortgagee. The transferor retained an
option to reacquire the property by paying an amount roughly equal
to the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The court determined
that the transfer was, in fact, a loan intended to give the mortgagor
additional time to satisfy the obligation and to eliminate the com-
plications of foreclosure if he did not meet its terms. Consequently,
there was no taxable event. Where the repurchase option is not
subject to the transferor's control, however, a court very well might
find an executed sale.12 Similarly, where the taxpayer received ad-
vance payments from the transferee, the facts may indicate either
a sale or a loan. The substance, and not the form, of the transfer
will control the tax consequences. Thus, in United States v. Ivey,8 3
payments from a selling agent to a cotton farmer were held to be
loans in the year received despite the taxpayer's evidence that he
actually thought a sale had occurred. The court found that the
terms of the brokerage agreement indicated a loan, the proceeds of
which were not taxable at the time of receipt.
E. Bootstrap Sales
The typical bootstrap sale attempts to convert ordinary business
income into capital gain by having the purchase price payable out
of the operating profits of the business. The transaction may take a
variety of forms, 84 but generally proceeds as follows: A sells an incor-
porated business to B, with or without a small down payment. B
agrees to pay the balance of the purchase price solely out of profits
to be generated by the business. Thereafter, B liquidates the corpo-
ration and leases the business assets to C, a corporation newly
formed to operate the business. A, the collective shareholders of the
original business, manages the operation for C. A, in fact, may own
a substantial minority interest in C. Approximately eighty percent
of C's business profits are paid as rent to B, who remits ninety
82. Resthaven Memorial Cemetery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 683 (1941).
83. 414 F.2d 199, 24 A.F.T.R.2d 69-5322 (5th Cir. 1969); see Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus
& Co., 308 U.S. 252, 23 A.F.T.R. 778 (1939) (finding the "owner-lessor" to be a mortgagee);
124 Front St. Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 6 (1975), nonacq. 1976-2 C.B. 3; Frenzel v.
Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1391 (1963). See also Cunningham & Tischler, Disguised
Real Estate Security Transactions as Mortgages in Substance, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1972);
Marcus, Real Estate Purchase-Leasebacks as Secured Loans, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 664 (1974).
84. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 790 (1965); University
Hill Foundation v. Commissioner, 446 F.2d 701, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-1419 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972); Allen v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 242 (1975). See also
B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 11
7.07 at 7-38 (3d ed. 1971); Joyce & Del Cotto, The AB (ABC) and BA Transactions: An
Economic and Tax Analysis of Reserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAX L. REV.
121 (1976); Llewellyn, Lewis, & Majors, Sale of a Close Corporate Business: A Transactional
Approach, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 43, 56-59 (1975); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and
Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 295 (1962).
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percent of those receipts to A until the purchase price is paid. B has
no obligation to pay A out of any funds other than the rent paid by
C.
Prior to 1969, the bootstrap sale was an attractive device by which
A could sell a business to B, a tax-exempt organization, and have
the purchase price paid out of business profits. Before enactment of
the debt-financed property provisions in 1969,'5 some exempt organ-
izations were taxable on rental income from real property to the
extent the property was acquired with borrowed money. There was
an exception, however, for rental income from a lease of five years
or less,"' and there was some uncertainty as to whether the tax
applied to income from a tax-exempt organization's leasing of assets
which constituted a going business.87
In 1969, Congress amended the Code to provide that all exempt
organizations' income from "debt-financed" property, which is un-
related to their exempt functions, is subject to tax in the proportion
to which the property is financed by the debt.8 As a result, the
bootstrap sale is now less attractive, though it still retains some of
its former utility.
The bootstrap sale presents two major problems with respect to
capital gain. First, the Service probably will contend that the trans-
action really is a loan from A to B and, also, that the proceeds of
the "sale" are substitutes for A's ordinary business profits. Essen-
tially, the argument posits that A has retained an income interest
in the transferred business equal to the amount of the sales price.
Therefore, the government sees the transaction not as one involving
a disposition of property that is a capital asset, but rather as a loan
to be repaid exclusively from ordinary income.
The second problem arises when the purported sales price is un-
certain or not a close approximation of the business's fair market
value. Here, the Service may attempt to restructure the transaction
as part loan, part gift, with the retention of an income interest equal
to the sales price that is eventually determined1O These arguments
generally are accompanied by the subsidiary contention that the
85. I.R.C. § 514.
86. Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 C.B. 128.
87. See Allen v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 242 (1975); S. REP. No. 91-552, supra
note 57.
88. I.R.C. § 514(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(d)(1), 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
89. See Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 301 F.2d 654, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 1389
(10th Cir. 1962); Ayrton Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 741, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1962); Allen v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 242 (1975); Rev. Rul. 66-153, 1966-1 C.B.
187. See generally Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 84; see also Lazarus v. Commissioner, 513
F.2d 824, 35 A.F.T.R.2d 75-1191 (9th Cir. 1975).
90. See sources collected in Allen v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 242 (1975).
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whole transaction merely is a substitute for future ordinary in-
come. '
F. Sale or Lease
There are a variety of ways in which a lease can be an efficacious
means of effecting a sale. But since the tax consequences will vary
greatly depending upon the existence of a sale or a lease, it is imper-
ative to determine the point at which today's lease shades into
tomorrow's equity." In general, the courts have employed two inter-
connected tests to distinguish leases from sales: the first examines
the economic reality of the transaction, the second searches for an
intent to purchase. If the transaction is found to be a sale under
either of these tests, it is classified as a sale for all purposes involved
here.
The cases and rulings have been concerned primarily with the
situation in which the lessee has an option to acquire title to the
leased property. The courts are careful to examine the transaction,
especially when it occurs in a business setting, to see if it really is a
covert attempt to convert a capital acquisition into a series of fully
deductible rental payments. Where the sum of the rents plus the
acquisition price equals the deferred purchase price of the property,
including an interest component, the transaction almost invariably
will be categorized as a conditional sale. Although other factors
enter into the evidentiary calculus, where "the payments on the
substituted basis of rent would produce for the lessor the equivalent
of [the] normal sales price plus interest," 3 the "lease" will be
treated as a sale.
For instance, in Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, the taxpayer
had an option to renew a lease on a sprinkler system which had been
installed in his plant.' The original term of the lease was five years,
with annual rent of $1,240; the renewal term was identical, but the
rent was reduced to thirty-two dollars annually. The contract was
silent on the system's ownership after the two-,terms, but provided
that the lessor had six months after the expiration of the first term
to remove the system in the event that the lessee chose not to extend
the lease. The taxpayer deducted the "rent" as an ordinary and
necessary business expense.
Because the Commissioner thought the transaction was actually
91. See, e.g., id. at 261-63.
92. See Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294, 294, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 572 (9th Cir.
1959) ("Yesterday's equities in personal property ... have become today's leases.").
93. Id. at 296.
94. 274 F.2d 294, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1959), rev'g 30 T.C. 856 (1958).
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a sale, he allowed a deduction for depreciation, but not for rent. The
Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's disallowance of the rent
deductions on the ground that the rent was a capital expenditure. 5
On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's finding that
the lease actually was a sale, but reversed and remanded the deci-
sion to grant the taxpayer an interest, as well as a depreciation,
deduction. The court disregarded the form of the transaction be-
cause "the foreordained practical effect of the rent [was] to pro-
duce title eventually, [and therefore,] the rental agreement can be
treated as a sale."" The appellate court simply found the entire
lease to be incredible and was influenced strongly by the evidence
that the lessor never, in fact, reclaimed any of its systems installed
for other taxpayers. Moreover, they found the following to be deci-
sive: (1) the rent essentially equaled the sales price of the system
plus interest on the deferred payments; (2) the value of the leased
property to the lessor was negligible at the expiration of the lease;
and, (3) there was no reference to the property's disposition at the
end of the second lease term. 7
In evaluating whether a purported lease in fact is a sale, the
following elements are given varying degrees of consideration:"
(1) Rent plus deferred acquisition price equaled the normal
sales price of the property, plus interest on the deferred payout
period;
(2) The lessee could acquire the property at the termination of
the lease for a nominal amount;
(3) The value and/or useful life of the leased property to the
lessor at the expiration of the lease term, including renewal periods,
was negligible;
(4) The permanency of the leased item coupled with the uncer-
tainty that the lessor would act to reacquire the property upon the
failure of the lessee to acquire it;
95. 30 T.C. at 864.
96. 274 F.2d at 295; cf. Kingsbury v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1068, 1084-85 n.9 (1976), acq.
1975-2 C.B. 2 (lump-sum payment for the exchange of rights under an operating agreement
was not a loan, but rather partial payment for the transfer of the rights in question, albeit
one arranged to avoid scrutiny by local officials).
97. 274 F.2d at 296; cf. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 48 A.F.T.R. 335 (9th
Cir. 1955) (nominal option price held to classify "lease" as a sale); Rev. Rul. 75-563, 1975-2
C.B. 199 (an "irrevocable written option," granting immediate possession, unrestricted use,
and title acquisition upon payment, constituted a sale for purposes of § 483); Rev. Rul. 57-
371, 1957-2 C.B. 214 (lease of sprinkler system held to be a sale); Rev. Rul. 55-25, 1955-1 C.B.
283 (Lessee could acquire title to leased property by paying an amount which equaled the
lessor's purchase price plus incremental costs, including interest. Risks of ownership were on
the lessee. Rental deduction disallowed.).
98. See Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294, 5 A.F.T.R.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1959);
sources cited supra note 97.
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(5) Rents paid being credited against the purchase price as com-
puted under the applicable formula;
(6) Absence of any reference to the disposition of the property
in the event that the lessee did not purchase it;
(7) Certainty that the lessee would acquire the property, espe-
cially where the lessee has improved the property, etc.;
(8) Whether the rent was in excess of the fair rental value of the
property at the time that the lease was executed;
(9) Whether the lessor actually owned the property prior to the
arrangement under which it was leased to the lessee, or whether the
lessor was acquiring equity in the property contemporaneously with
the lessee's payments;
(10) Obligation that the lessee maintain insurance on the prop-
erty equal to the outstanding rent plus the amount necessary to
acquire the property;
(11) An uneven schedule of rental payments;
(12) Financial ability of the lessee to have acquired the property
at the commencement of the lease term;
(13) The presence of benefits to the lessor other than tax bene-
fits, and the presence of a tax indemnity clause;
(14) Relationship of rental payments to acquisition cost and to
fair rental value;
(15) Risk of loss provisions, assignment of warranty provisions
to the lessee;
(16) Ability of the lessee to acquire the property at any time
other than upon the termination of the lease, and the terms upon
which this could occur;
(17) Whether the fair market value of the property at the time
it could be acquired was arrived at by reference to the manufac-
turer's sale of similar used property.
The cases frequently stress the fact that the terms of the particu-
lar contract obligate the lessee to pay rent substantially equal to the
value of the property and give it the option to acquire ownership
subsequent to the payment of these amounts. In some cases the
option price is nominal, and in others it approximates the fair mar-
ket value of the property at the time the option may be exercised.
In the former instance, the lease is certainly a sale; in the latter, it
very well may be found to be a sale depending upon the aggregate
weight given to the various factors listed above. For example, in
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Commissioner," the court sustained
the taxpayers' contentions that certain transactions constituted
99. 58 T.C. 836 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 1222, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-5600 (9th Cir.
1974).
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leases rather than conditional sales. The particular contracts in
question contained many of the provisions generally thought to indi-
cate the presence of a sale, including third party guarantees of the
lessee's rental obligation and of any options exercised, as well as
myriad clauses designed to minimize the lessor's risk of loss. Never-
theless, the court found that the facts did not lead to the conclusion
that the transactions were sales. The guarantees did not obligate the
lessees to purchase the equipment, nor was the lessor bound to sell
it. Instead, the court reasoned, the lessor attempted to minimize all
risks and efforts on its part, including the downside risk of a deflated
residuary value.'0 The Northwest Acceptance court was impressed
by the fact that the lessor had entered into a large number of equip-
ment sales and rentals but had always differentiated between the
two types of transactions. Even where the contract was designated
a "lease," the lessor treated it as a sale if it in fact was a conditional
sale. Consequently, the facts and circumstances did not evidence an
intention to effectuate a sale at the time the lease was executed.','
Similarly, in Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 02 the
taxpayer actually paid a substantial amount to acquire the property
at the termination of the lease. Upon entering into the lease, the
lessee had no ability under the contract to acquire the property. In
addition, the evidence showed that the taxpayer was unable finan-
cially to have acquired the property at the time it entered into the
lease. Accordingly, the court determined that the transaction was a
bona fide lease, not a conditional sales contract. The court further
stated that an intention to acquire the lease property at the time
the parties entered into the contract would be decisive in categoriz-
ing the contract as a sale rather than as a lease.
In LTV Corp. v. Commissioner the Tax Court held that the trans-
action was a bona fide lease of an IBM computer.'' The court em-
phasized that the acquisition price was based on the charge the
manufacturer would require for the purchase of a similarly used
computer. Moreover, the court found that it was reasonable to re-
quire the lessee to insure the equipment for the amount of the out-
standing rent plus the amount necessary to exercise the option.""
100. 58 T.C. at 848. See also Lockhart Leasing Co. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 301 (1970),
aff'd, 446 F.2d 269, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-1508 (10th Cir. 1971).
101. Cf. American Realty Trust v. United States, 498 F.2d 1194, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-5308
(4th Cir. 1974) (jury verdict finding an intention to effectuate a "good faith" sale and lease-
back, but not a tax avoidance "financial arrangement," upheld as not clearly erroneous);
Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319, 49 A.F.T.R. 895 (7th Cir. 1956)
(the "economic reality" did not evince an intention to sell the property).
102. 271 F.2d 694, 4 A.F.T.R.2d 5753 (8th Cir. 1959).
103. 63 T.C. 39, 49-50 (1974).
104. Id. at 50.
CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
The facts provided an advantageous setting for the taxpayer's con-
tentions that a lease, not a conditional sale, existed: the rentals
were reasonable in relation to the fair rental value of the computer,
the option was exercisable only at full market value at the expira-
tion of the lease, and the lessee used the equipment extensively in
its business. Furthermore, owing to computerware's characteristic
of rapid obsolescence, the court readily accepted the taxpayer's con-
tention that renting the computer was a better business decision
than outright acquisition would have been. Finally, the taxpayer
indicated that the terms of the lease with the lessor, who was not
the manufacturer, were more beneficial than those which it could
have received from IBM. The lessor charged the lessee according to
time period, while the manufacturer would have extracted a fee
based entirely on usage. Since the computer was to be in continual
use, the latter terms would have cost the taxpayer substantially
more than the former.
The LTV court relied heavily upon Northwest Acceptance and
Lockhart Leasing v. Commissioner, 10 but in doing so rejected the
distinction proposed by the taxpayer between the tax treatment
accorded to "commercial" vis-a-vis "financing" leases. 0 6 It did ac-
knowledge, however, that the latter sort of contract might be more
easily classified as a conditional sale since it frequently would lack
economic substance. 0 7
The question of whether a transaction is a lease or a sale is one
with which the courts and the Service have had a great deal of
experience. As a result, they have established a fairly comprehen-
sive list of factors to distinguish equity payments from rent pay-
ments.1°s
105. 54 T.C. 301 (1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 269, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-1508 (10th Cir. 1971).
106. 63 T.C. at 51.
107. Cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-1142 (1978)
(lessor in a sale-and-leaseback transaction was allowed deductions for depreciation and inter-
est).
It should be noted that the aforementioned decisions represent a substantial deviation from
the guidelines announced in Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715, as clarified by Rev. Proc. 75-
28, 1975-1 C.B. 752. In attempting to have a contract's self-classification as a lease sustained,
however, its utility is questionable. The Procedure itself states that it is not intended to
"define, as a matter of law, whether a transaction is or is not a lease for Federal income tax
purposes .... " Id. It seldom has been referred to by the courts; see, e.g., Estate of Franklin
v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-6164 (9th Cir. 1976). Further, in Frank
Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 579 n.14, the Supreme Court stated that "[tihese guidelines are not
intended to be definitive, and it is not clear that they provide much guidance in assessing
real estate transactions." See Rosenberg & Weinstein, Sales-Leasebacks: An Analysis of
These Transactions After the Lyon Decision, 45 J. TAX. 146 (1976). See generally Gallagher,
Shifting Professional Service Income Within the Family, 1 REV. TAX. INDIVIDUALS 237 (1977);
Gallagher, The Short-Term Trust as an Income-Shifting Device, 1 REv. TAX. INDIVIDUALS 343
(1977).
108. See text accompanying note 98 supra. See also Kingsbury v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.
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G. Transfers and Leasebacks
A transfer and leaseback may be arranged in a variety of ways,
each structured to meet the needs and expectations of the parties. '
The basic pattern, however, remains the same: A transfers property
to B, and B, in turn, leases it back to A. The transfer from A to B
could be a sale, a gift, or a security device, depending upon the
intentions of the parties and the relevant circumstances.'"' Natu-
rally the tax results that flow from the transaction will be contingent
on the character of the transfer itself.
Whether a transfer and leaseback amounts to a sale or exchange
necessitates a close examination of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances, including the alternative possibilities that the trans-
fer is a gift, a lease, or a loan. Many of the factors used to distinguish
a sale from the latter transfers are also used to determine the char-
acter of the transfer and leaseback arrangement. The leaseback,
however, frequently requires an examination of some facts not dis-
cussed previously in relation to gifts, leases, and loans. Moreover,
the determination of whether a sale has taken place will link various
factors together in novel combinations which often are as subtle as
the transaction under examination."'
In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, "2 the Court was faced with
the question of who was the owner of a building, for purposes of
taking depreciation and interest deductions, where the property was
transferred from a bank (A) to the taxpayer (B) and then leased
back to A under a long-term lease. A wanted to construct a bank
building on newly acquired land. It drew up the plans, entered into
construction contracts, and anticipated financing the structure it-
1068, 1087 (1976), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2 (court discussed the application of I.R.C. § 1241, after
the interest involved was determined to be "property" which could give rise to capital gain
through the application of § 1231); I.R.C. § 1241 ("Amounts received by a lessee for the
cancellation of a lease. . . shall be considered as amounts received in exchange for such lease
109. See generally Fox & Halperin, Tax Considerations in Refinancing Real Estate: The
Wrap-Around Mortgage and the Sale and Lease-Back, 1 J. REAL EST. TAX. 17 (1973); Marcus,
supra note 83; Mihlbaugh, Sale-Leaseback Financing, 36 OHIO B. 253 (1963); 42 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 557 (1967).
110. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-1142 (1978);
cf. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 23 A.F.T.R. 778 (1939) (owner-lessor
was mortgagee). See generally Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 84; Marcus, supra note 83;
Tuggle, Sale-and-Leaseback v. Mortgaging of Property: Tax Analysis of User's Position, 8
TAX. FOR ACC'Ts 260 (1972).
111. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 84; cf. Rollyson, Eighth Circuit Strikes Down Sale-
Leaseback; Strikes Out on Judicial Reasoning, 4 J. REAL EST. TAX. 85 (1976) (criticizing the
Eighth Circuit in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5060 (8th
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 561, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-1142 (1978)).
112. 435 U.S. 561, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-1142 (1978), rev'g 536 F.2d 746, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-
5060 (8th Cir. 1976).
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self. However, banking regulations prevented A from carrying such
an expensive asset on its books. Eventually, A entered into an arm's
length agreement with B pursuant to which B would supply
$500,000 of the $7.5 million needed for the construction. The bal-
ance of the financing had been secured in advance by A from an
institutional investor. A sold the building to B and leased it back
for a primary term of twenty-five years with renewal options that
could extend the term for another forty years. A retained the option
to repurchase the structure at designated times and for specified
prices. B's $500,000 investment was to bear six percent interest. All
rights and interests were assigned to the mortgage. A's annual rent
for the primary lease period equaled the exact amount necessary to
amortize completely the institutional mortgage. If A exercised its
repurchase option prior to the end of the mortgage term, it was to
assume the unpaid balance and pay B an amount exactly equal to
B's investment, compounded at six percent per annum.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, revers-
ing the district court,"' found that A (the bank) was the owner of
the building, and that B (the taxpayer) in effect merely loaned A
the $500,000.114 In arriving at this conclusion the court stated that
B entered the transaction simply for the tax benefits, "5 and that the
arrangement was without economic substance notwithstanding that
the parties intended a sale and a lease and labeled the documents
accordingly. ' ' Moreover, the court noted the following seven factors
which decisively influenced its determination:"'
(1) Lessee (A) retained tax benefits of investment credit and
deduction for sales tax paid on materials purchased by the lessor for
the building's construction;
(2) Lease restricted the lessor's (B) right to profit from a transfer
of the property by giving lessee (A) the right to purchase in the event
of a transfer of the ownership of the lessor company;
(3) Appreciation realized as the result of the destruction or con-
113. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 36 A.F.T.R.2d 75-5154 (E.D. Ark. 1975), rev'd, 536
F.2d 746, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5060 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 561, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-1142
(1978).
114. See 536 F.2d at 754.
115. Id. at 753; cf. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 306, 7 A.F.T.R.2d 1445 (1961)
("parties may for tax purposes act as their best interests dictate").
116. 536 F.2d at 751. For decisions indicating that the parties' intention upon entering
the agreement must be given due consideration, see generally Leslie Co. v. Commissioner,
539 F.2d 943, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5458 (3rd Cir. 1976); American Realty Trust v. United States,
498 F.2d 1194, 34 A.F.T.R.2d 74-5308 (4th Cir. 1974); American Nat'l Bank v. United States,
421 F.2d 442, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-482 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970); Western
Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694, 4 A.F.T.R.2d 5753 (8th Cir. 1959); Oester-
reich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 48 A.F.T.R. 335 (9th Cir. 1955).
117. 536 F.2d at 752-53. See also Rosenberg & Weinstein, supra note 107.
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demnation of the building accrued to the lessee;
(4) Purchase-option price was geared to the unpaid mortgage
balance plus the lessor's initial investment plus six percent com-
pound interest-no provision was made for an appraised value, and
neither appreciation nor inflation was taken into account;
(5) Final option price equaled the lessor's initial investment,
compounded at six percent-the present value of the future net
rentals, discounted at six percent, equaled the lessor's investment;
(6) Lessee retained effective control of the disposition of the
building through its purchase options for sixty-five years and its
ownership of the land thereafter;
(7) During the first twenty-five years of the lease the lessee had
all ownership risks, while the lessor merely served as a conduit for
the mortgage payments.
The court, relying heavily on the factually similar Helvering v. F.
& R. Lazarus & Co.,"' concluded that the benefits, risks, and bur-
dens assumed or incurred by the taxpayer were too insubstantial to
establish its ownership of the building. However, it expressly dis-
counted any implication that the bank was the owner of the leased
property (though it did find that the bank was the real party in
interest). In addition, the court reasoned that the taxpayer merely
served as a conduit for the bank's mortgage payment to the institu-
tional lender."' As a result of these conclusions, there could have
been no sale of the property from the bank to the taxpayer, and the
taxpayer was not allowed to take the interest and depreciation de-
ductions.
The Supreme Court granted taxpayer's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari and reversed the Eighth Circuit.' The Court initially noted
its adherence to substance over form: "'taxation is not so much
concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual command
over the property . . ,,. ' Because Lyon was solely liable on the
notes, Lyon should receive the deductions. Significantly, the Court
distinguished Lazarus on the basis that in that case only two parties
were involved in the transaction.'22 Here, however, there were three
parties: Lyon, the bank, and independent investors interested in
the transaction who would have entered the arrangement if Lyon
had not. This addition to the economics of the circumstances was
sufficient to remove Lazarus as controlling authority.
The Court recognized that the position taken by the government
118. 308 U.S. 252, 23 A.F.T.R. 778 (1939).
119. 536 F.2d at 754.
120. 435 U.S. 561.
121. Id. at 572.
122. Id. at 575.
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and the Eighth Circuit-that the bank should be regaxded as the
true owner of the building and nothing more than the recipient of a
$500,000 loan-was "not without superficial appeal.' ' 1 3 It felt, how-
ever, that neither of the parties was the owner "in any simple
sense." In justification of its decision that Lyon was entitled to the
deductions, the Court compiled an exhaustive list of factors indicat-
ing that the taxpayer had "actual command" over the property and
that the transaction was not merely a tax avoidance sham. Some of
the more important of these factors included:'24 Lyon's sole liability
on successive notes to two different financial institutions; Lyon's
independence from the bank, and Lyon's "substantiality," meaning
its separate, significant position in the business world; the bank's
inability, because of legal restrictions, to secure conventional fund-
ing; the requirement by the federal regulator that an independent
third party own the building; the presence of numerous financial
institutions interested in the transaction, as well as the submission
of formal proposals by several of them; the fact that Lyon's ordinary
business was unconcerned with financing; the three-party aspect of
the circumstances mentioned above (the distinguishing factor from
Lazarus); the absence of agreement between Lyon and the bank
that the bank would exercise its purchase options; and the
"inescapable fact" that Lyon definitely would be the owner of the
building if the building lease were not extended.
In conclusion, the Court stated that genuine, multi-party transac-
tions of economic substance, which are compelled or encouraged by
regulatory or economic realities, should be honored by the govern-
ment when entered into for tax-independent purposes, but not
where they are "shaped solely by tax avoidance features that have
meaningless labels attached . "2... "I In other words, if the lessor
retains significant, genuine attributes ordinarily retained by lessors,
the form of the transaction adopted by the parties should not be
disturbed. What the relevant attributes are will depend upon the
facts in each case.
The court in Leslie Co. v. Commissioner' reached a decision
identical to that in Frank Lyon Co. In Leslie the taxpayer (A) agreed
to sell a factory to an insurance company (B) for the lesser of 2.4
million dollars or the land and construction costs. A and B executed
a long-term lease under which A retained several renewal options
and a repurchase privilege. The costs substantially exceeded the 2.4
123. Id. at 581.
124. Id. at 582-83.
125. Id. at 584.
126. 539 F.2d 943, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-5458 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'g 64 T.C. 247 (1975).
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million dollar price, and following the sale to B, A took a capital
loss. The Service contended that the A/B transaction was not a sale,
but rather a section 1031 nonrecognition exchange of like-kind prop-
erty.'2 The Tax Court ruled in favor of Leslie stating that the trans-
fer was not an "exchange," which would have required a "reciprocal
transfer of property," but was rather a sale-a transfer of property
for a "money consideration."'' 8 Interestingly, despite finding that
Leslie would not have entered the arrangement without the lease-
back (suggesting something other than a sale), the court declared
that this, alone, was not dispositive of the issue.'
The Third Circuit affirmed, explaining that the taxpayer's ac-
tions objectively evidenced an intent to execute a sale and that the
facts did not support the prerequisites of an exchange under Treas-
ury Regulation section 1.1002-1(d). 30 Moreover, in transferring the
premises the company severed its ownership rights, and the mortga-
gee, in effect, assumed these benefits, burdens, and risks. 3'
Leslie and Frank Lyon Co. clearly show the difficulties that tax-
payers have encountered in attempting to establish that a transfer
and leaseback actually involved a sale. 32 Leslie shows the additional
problems that may be incurred in proving not only that the transfer
was a sale, but that it was not an exchange covered by one of the
nonrecognition provisions of the Code.' 33
H. Statutory Sales or Exchanges
A number of events are treated as sales or exchanges by the Code
even though they do not involve commercial or technical sales or
exchanges. Some of these events are discussed briefly in the follow-
ing paragraphs. 31
127. 64 T.C. at 250-52, noted in 21 VILL. L. REV. 332 (1976).
128. 64 T.C. at 252 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(d) (1957)).
129. 64 T.C. at 250.
130. 539 F.2d at 949 (citing Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 4
A.F.T.R.2d 5341 (2d Cir. 1959) (sale and leaseback was a sale on which a loss was recog-
nized)). The Service had relied on Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 41
A.F.T.R. 205 (8th Cir. 1951) (sale and leaseback was a § 1031 like-kind exchange on which
no gain or loss was recognized), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
131. 539 F.2d at 949.
132. See generally sources cited note 109 supra.
133. Compare Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 4 A.F.T.R.2d 5341 (2d
Cir. 1959) with Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 41 A.F.T.R. 205 (8th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
134. Note that I.R.C. § 1235, discussed in section II.C.2. supra, treats a transfer of
substantial rights to a patent (or an undivided interest therein) as a sale or exchange. And
I.R.C. § 1253, discussed in section III.C.I. supra, provides that a transfer of a franchise,
trademark, etc., shall not be treated as a sale or exchange if any significant power, right, or
continuing interest is retained.
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1. Bad Debts and Worthless Securities
A business bad debt is characterized as an ordinary loss under
section 166(a),'3 while section 166(d) considers a nonbusiness bad
debt a loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for less
than one year-that is, a short-term capital loss.
Where a security that is a capital asset becomes worthless during
the taxable year, section 165(g) treats the loss as one from the "sale
or exchange" of a capital asset on the last day of the year.' 31 Hence,
there is no need to determine the exact date the security became
worthless, or to establish the occurrence of an actual sale or ex-
change. The taxpayer need only demonstrate that it was a
"security," as defined in section 165(g)(2), (3), that became worth-
less. Section 166(e) provides that a debt evidenced by a security
within the meaning of section 165(g)(2)(C) comes under section
165(g), allowing, thereby, sale or exchange treatment.
2. Stock Redemptions, Corporation Liquidations, and Deficit
Distributions
Under the rules of section 302, stock redemptions are treated as
sales or exchanges of the stock.'37 Similarly, section 331 treats the
receipt of cash or assets for stock in a partial or complete corporate
liquidation as an exchange of the stock.' Section 301(c)(3) treats a
shareholder's gain from a distribution in excess of his stock's basis
as gain from the sale or exchange of property.' 39
3. Retirement of Bonds
As previously noted, the collection of a claim is not a sale or
exchange.'40 Similarly, since a bond is a debt of the obligor, its
retirement at face value would not constitute a sale or exchange in
the absence of a statutory modification. Where a corporate or gov-
135. See United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 103-05, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-609 (1972) (a
"business" debt occurs when the motivation for incurring that debt had business purposes
which were "dominant," not merely "significant").
136. Section 165(g)(2) defines security to include corporate stock, the right to receive
same, or an evidence of indebtedness. See generally Bersch & Lonie, When Does Moratorium
Lead to Deductible Tax Loss for New York City Noteholders, 45 J. TAX. 20 (1976); Spiegel &
Buell, New York City Notes-Are Taxpayers Who Did Not Exchange Notes for Big MAC
Bonds Entitled to Loss Deduction?, 54 TAXES 468 (1976).
137. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 84, ch. 9, for an excellent discussion of stock
redemptions.
138. See B. BITrKER & J. EuSTCE, supra note 84, 7.60-9.65 and ch. 11, for an analysis
of partial and complete liquidations.
139. This only applies to that portion of the distribution which is not from current or
accumulated earnings.
140. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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ernment bond or obligation otherwise is a capital asset, section
1232(a)(1) provides that its retirement is considered to be a sale or
exchange.' 4' Thus, section 1232 attempts to equalize the tax conse-
quences of a bond's collection on retirement with a preretirement
sale of the same bond. However, any amount of the gain attribut-
able to unreported original issue discount is characterized as ordi-
nary income by section 1232(a)(3)." 2
4. Involuntary Conversions and Sales and Exchanges of
Business Property
A partial or entire involuntary conversion of property by condem-
nation, destruction, seizure, or theft, or a forced disposition of the
property under one of these conditions, will be treated as a sale of
the property by section 1033. However, the taxpayer may elect to
forego the recognition of gain by using the proceeds of the involun-
tarily converted property to acquire similar assets or property re-
lated in service or use to that which was converted.4 3 Property that
is used in a trade or business (as defined in section 1231(b)),4 and
capital assets held for more than one year which are involuntarily
converted enter the section 1231 hotchpot.'1 If the recognized gains
from such property plus the recognized gains from the sales or ex-
changes of business property exceed the recognized losses, then both
the gains and the losses are considered to be gains and losses from
the sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than one
year.'" On the other hand, if the losses exceed the gains, then the
losses and gains will be considered ordinary.
5. Options To Buy or Sell
Under section 1234, gain or loss from the sale, exchange, or expira-
tion of an option to buy or sell property is considered to be gain or
loss from the sale or exchange of an asset which has the same char-
141. See Jamison v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 221, 23 A.F.T.R.2d 69-467 (N.D. Cal.
1968), aff'd per curiam, 445 F.2d 1397, 28 A.F.T.R.2d 71-5550 (9th Cir. 1971).
142. See Part One, supra note 2, section I.F.
143. I.R.C. § 1033(a).
144. Here, the term does not include inventory, property held for sale primarily to custom-
ers, or § 1221(3) property (copyrights, compositions, etc.).
145. Of course, the taxpayer cannot have made a nonrecognition election under I.R.C. §
1033(a). See Part One, supra note 2, section II.D. See also I.R.C. §§ 1071, 1081; Lee, Supreme
Court's Central Tablet Decision Limits Use of 337 for Involuntary Conversions, 41 J. TAX.
130 (1974); McLean & Roberts, Tax Aspects of Condemnation and Involuntary Conversion,
9 (no. 6) PRuc. LAW. 37 (1963); Schaff, Tax Consequences of an Involuntary Conversion, 46
TAXES 323 (1968).
146. I.R.C. § 12 31(a); see Part One, supra note 2, section II.D.
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acter as the property to which the option relates.'47 If loss is attribut-
able to failure to exercise the option, the option is deemed to have
been sold or exchanged on the day it expired. "' In the case of a
grantor of an option for stock, securities, or commodities, section
1234(b) treats gain or loss from a closing transaction regarding the
option and gain on the lapse of the option as gain or loss from the
sale or exchange of a capital asset held less than one year."
6. Mineral and Timber Interests
Section 631 treats the disposition of certain mineral and timber
interests, in return for a royalty, as a sale; section 1231(b)(2) brings
such sales within section 1231's capital gain-ordinary loss rules.'5 0
7. Cancellation of Lease or Distributor's Agreement
Under section 1241, amounts received by a lessee for the cancella-
tion of a lease, or by a distributor of goods for the cancellation of a
distributor's agreement, are considered as amounts received in ex-
change for the lease or agreement. Section 1241 does not apply to
lessors or to suppliers, nor does it characterize the lease or distribu-
torship agreement as a capital asset-it only qualifies the cancella-
tion as an exchange. The Regulations define a cancellation as the
complete termination of all contractual rights of a lessee or a distrib-
utor, other than by expiration, with respect to a particular premises,
distributorship, or severable economic portion of it or its duration.''
Payments made for other modifications do not qualify the cancella-
tion as an exchange. 52 Personal service distributorships do not come
under section 1241 which applies only to marketing, or marketing
and servicing of goods.'5 3 In addition, the distributor must have a
substantial capital investment in the distributorship, which is re-
147. See Part One, supra note 2, section II.E.; cf. United States Freight Co. v. United
States, 422 F.2d 887, 25 A.F.T.R.2d 70-670 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (forfeiture of a purchaser's down
payment as liquidated damages on default held not to be the expiration of an option under §
1239).
148. I.R.C. § 1234(a)(2).
149. A "closing transaction" is any termination of the grantor's obligation other than
through the exercise or lapse of the option. I.R.C. § 1234(b)(2)(A).
150. See Gallagher, Christmas Tree Taxation, 5 J. REAL EST. TAX. 213 (1978).
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.1241-1(b) (1957). See generally, Schlosberg, Income Tax Conse-
quences of the Assignment or Cancellation of a Leasehold, 10 TAX L. REV. 257 (1954).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.1241-1(b) (1957).
153. Id. Until rendered obsolete by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, I.R.C. § 1240 treated a
limited category of employment termination payments as sales or exchanges of capital assets.
See L. EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 156-57 (1961) for a discussion of the initiation
of this special tax treatment for the benefit of Louis B. Mayer, of Hollywood fame. See also
S. REP. No. 781, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1951).
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flected in physical assets actually used in and comprising a signifi-
cant part of the distributorship's operations. 5'
IV. THE HOLDING PERIOD
A. In General
The length of time a taxpayer has held a capital asset will deter-
mine whether gain or loss on a sale or exchange will be "long-term"
or "short-term."'' 5 This, in turn, will affect the tax treatment ac-
corded to the resulting gain or loss. 58 Subsection (3) of section 1222
defines long-term capital gain as gain from the sale or exchange of
a capital asset held for more than one year; subsection (4) defines
long-term capital loss in the same way. Short-term capital gains and
losses result from sales and exchanges of capital assets held for one
year or less.157
Ordinarily, the length of time the property has been held is clear,
so that there will be no problem in determining whether gain or loss
is long- or short-term. In any event, the holding period must be
known. In close questions it is important to determine, in months
and days, when the asset was acquired and when it was sold or
exchanged. For example, in computing a period of years or months,
commencing with a specified day, date, or act, unless it appears
otherwise, the specified day is excluded and the last day of the
period is included.' If property is acquired on the last day of a
month, regardless of the number of days in that month, it must be
held at least until the first day of the thirteenth month following the
acquisition to have been held for more than one year. Thus to satisfy
this requirement an asset acquired on June 30 of one year must not
be sold or exchanged before July 1 of the following year.5 '
Occasionally it may not be clear exactly when property was ac-
quired. There is no problem where the known holding period defi-
nitely exceeds one year, but complications could arise if it is not
precisely known which dates constitute the beginning or ending of
the holding period. For example, in Revenue Ruling 66-97 the tax-
payer requested advice on whether there was a difference for holding
period purposes between a trade on a registered securities exchange
154. Treas. Reg. § 1.1241-1(b) (1957).
155. See generally Holzman, The Holding Period, 46 TAXES 110 (1968); Sultan, The Capi-
tal Gains "Holding" Dilemma, 16 VAND. L. REV. 535 (1963). See also Fredland, Gray, &
Sunley, The Six Month Holding Period for Capital Gains: An Empirical Analysis of its Effect
on the Timing of Gains, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 467 (1968).
156. See section V, infra, for a discussion of the mechanics of the capital gains tax.
157. I.R.C. § 1222(1), (2).
158. Rev. Rul. 66-7, 1966-1 C.B. 188.
159. See id.
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and a trade in an over-the-counter market.'6 This question raised
the distinction between the "trade" date, the day on which a
purchase-sale contract is executed, and the "settlement" date, the
time for delivery and payment. In some securities transactions the
settlement date is a specified number of days following the trade;
in bond, note, and indebtedness transactions the securities are con-
sidered transferred on the trade date. The Treasury responded that
the holding period excluded the acquisition day but included the
sale day regardless of whether the trade occurs on a registered ex-
change or over the counter."'
Fewer close questions arise concerning the holding period of realty
since it generally is held for a more extended time period. Neverthe-
less, the numerous ways in which title to realty can pass present a
wide variety of times at which a holding period could begin or end,
such as the date of an enforceable contract or the passing of title,
possession, or risks of ownership. Where there is an unconditional
contract of sale, the holding period is measured from the earlier of
the passage of title or the delivery of possession and the attributes
of ownership.6 2 The duration of an installment or conditional sales
contract will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of
the transaction.'6 3 And, even though a purchase option contract will
not begin or end a holding period, if, practically speaking, the bur-
dens and benefits of ownership have been transferred, 6 4 the contract
itself may be found to be a sale which, in turn, will measure the
period.' 5
A special holding period rule applies to newly constructed prop-
erty sold shortly after completion. Rather than simply measuring
160. 1966-1 C.B. 190.
161. Id.
162. Boykin v. Commissioner, 344 F.2d 889, 15 A.F.T.R.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1965); Hoven v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 50 (1971); accord, Bradford v. United States, 444 F.2d 1133, 28
A.F.T.R.2d 71-5228 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 1391, 25 A.F.T.R.2d
70-1254 (9th Cir. 1970); Rev. Rul. 71-265, 1971-1 C.B. 223; cf. Rev. Rul. 75-563, 1975-2 C.B.
199 ("irrevocable written option" to purchase land contained all of the indicia of a sale,
irrespective of optionee's right to terminate by refusal to pay installments). See generally
Becker v. Commissioner, 378 F.2d 767, 19 A.F.T.R.2d 1642 (3d Cir. 1967); see also Helvering
v. San Joaquin Fruit v. Inv. Co., 297 U.S. 496, 17 A.F.T.R. 470 (1936); Chemetron Corp. v.
Commissioner, 299 F.2d 644, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 54-607, 1954-2 C.B.
177.
163. See Kanter, Using Revaluation Clauses to Avoid Gifts Under Holding Company
Plans, 116 TR. & EST. 388 (1977); cf. Rev. Rul. 76-42, 1976-1 C.B. 102 (the return of escrowed
shares of the acquiring corporation owing to the failure of the acquired corporation to attain
the specified earnings level does not result in gain or loss by the shareholder creating the
escrow); Rev. Proc. 76-1, 1976-1 C.B. 542 (the Service will not rule on redemptions where
purchase price is based on a promise to pay an amount contingent on earnings).
164. See Rev. Rul. 71-265, 1971-1 C.B. 223.
165. See Rev. Rul. 75-563, 1975-2 C.B. 199.
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the holding period from the date of either the beginning or comple-
tion of the construction, the courts measure back one year from the
date of sale of the building (or other property) and allow long-term
capital gain or loss treatment for "the cost of that part of the build-
ing which was erected as of that date."'66 For example, suppose a
taxpayer began construction of a building on January 1, 1975, com-
pleted construction on January 1, 1976, and sold the building on
February 1, 1976. The court would count back one year from the
date of sale to February 1, 1975, and then allow long-term treatment
for the actual costs of construction up to that date. Significantly, it
is not the expenditures for construction which the court considers,
but rather the actual cost of constructing the building as it existed
one year prior to sale.
In successful exploratory ventures a rule analogous to the newly
constructed property rule applies. This rule begins one holding pe-
riod for the newly discovered property, but continues the taxpayer's
holding period as to property held prior to the discovery.167 The
property located is treated as a new asset, with a new holding period
measured from the time of discovery.
Under section 631(a) a taxpayer may elect to treat the sale of cut
timber that he has owned for the statutory time as a sale or ex-
change of a capital asset. Here, however, instead of the regular
acquisition/exclusion, disposition/inclusion rule, the sale day is ex-
cluded from the holding period and the day of purchase is in-
cluded. 68
B. Tacking
Section 1223 contains a number of rules covering the "tacking"
of holding periods. In certain instances one taxpayer can add the
period he has held the property to the time his predecessor held it
to increase the holding period and thereby receive capital gain treat-
ment."9 For example, in nonrecognition transfers the periods for
166. Paul v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 763, 766, 44 A.F.T.R. 319 (3rd Cir. 1953); see e.g.,
Williams v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 582, 585, 7 A.F.T.R.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1961); Dunigan v.
Burnet, 66 F.2d 201, 12 A.F.T.R. 965 (D.C. Cir. 1933); R. O'Brien & Co. v. United States, 51
A.F.T.R. 1249 (D. Mass. 1956); Aagaard v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 191, 207-08 (1971); Draper
v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 545 (1959).
167. Petroleum Exploration v. Commissioner, 193 F.2d 59, 41 A.F.T.R. 453 (4th Cir.
1951); cf. Harris v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 156 (1925) (taxpayer did not acquire an
"exploration" property upon a play becoming successful).
168. Rev. Rul. 66-6, 1966-1 C.B. 160.
169. See, e.g., Helvering v. Gambrill, 313 U.S. 11, 25 A.F.T.R. 1226 (1941). Under §
1223(6) the time an option is held is not tacked to the holding period of the property subject
to the option. See also Estes, Selected Holding Period and Timing Problems and Opportuni-
ties of Investors in Securities-Possibilities for the Utilization of Put and Call Options, in
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which the transferor and transferee have held the property will be
aggregated to determine the transferor's holding period.'70 Likewise,
holding periods are tacked in like-kind exchanges under section 1031
and in certain exchanges of securities. 7' Section 1223(7) provides
that after a section 1034 nonrecognition acquisition of a new resi-
dence, the holding period of the old residence is tacked on. Tacking
also occurs where property is received as a gift or as a testamentary
transfer.' Generally speaking, all of the section 1223 rules relate to
tax-free acquisitions or exchanges and are correlatives to the rules
governing substitution of basis.7 3
The term "held" generally is equated with "acquired," which is
construed as "ownership."'' 4 Normally, ownership commences in
the year in which title passes, but it may be considered to have
begun at an earlier time.'75 For example, the passage of title may
be treated as a mere formality where the purchaser has the indicia
of ownership, such as its benefits and burdens, and is in possession
of the property, or where all the conditions of an executory contract
have been satisfied.' 6 Similarly, the holding period may begin,
under certain circumstances, on the exercise of a purchase option.'77
Thus, it is important to determine when the sale has occurred,
especially when a Code section, such as section 337, makes action
in that year pivotal.
C. Escrows
When property is sold, gain or loss generally is realized in the year
of the sale. A sale usually is considered to be completed when title
passes.'78 However, a sale is not completed if delivery is to an escrow
TULANE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW TWENTY-FouRTH ANNUAL TAX INSTITUTE 66 (H. Fuller ed.
1975).
170. I.R.C. § 1223(2)-(3).
171. Id. § 1223(3).
172. Id. § 1223(1), (11).
173. Id. § 1223(1).
174. See McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 107, 16 A.F.T.R. 965 (1935) ("In com-
mon understanding, to hold property is to own it. In order to own or hold one must acquire.
The date of acquisition is, then, that from which to compute the duration of ownership or
the length of holding."); Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Inv. Co., 297 U.S. 496, 499, 17
A.F.T.R. 470 (1936) ("The word 'acquired' is not a term of art in the law of property but one
in common use.").
175. Rev. Rul. 71-265, 1971-1 C.B. 223.
176. Id. See also Note, Taxation: Use of Escrow Arrangements in Installment Sales, 27
OKLA. L. REV. 543 (1974).
177. See Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71 (1976).
178. Morco Corp. v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 245, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1962); Com-
missioner v. Segall, 114 F.2d 706, 709, 25 A.F.T.R. 698 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
562 (1941). See generally McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102, 16 A.F.T.R. 965 (1935).
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agent and the obligations to buy and sell are not established uncon-
ditionally by the agreement.'79 It is only on the fulfillment of the
condition or the happening of the event that gain or loss is realized
and must be reported. 8 1 Conversely, the sale will be completed on
delivery of the property to the escrowee where the obligations of the
parties are fixed unconditionally by the agreement. The use of an
escrow agent as a security device to insure the performance of the
parties' respective obligations will not prevent the completion of the
sale under these circumstances.' 8 '
Differentiating a security from a conditions escrow arrangement
may be difficult, since the difference will be evidenced by the facts
of the transaction together with the intention of the parties as mani-
fested in the agreement. Placing the deed or purchase price in es-
crow may not defer taxable gain or deductible loss if the setting of
the transaction indicates that a sale has been effected. Thus the
retention of the deed in escrow may be treated as a security device
if the purchaser is in possession of the property or otherwise has the
indicia of ownership.8 2 The intention of the parties should be ex-
pressed clearly.
Since an escrow arrangement can defer the time of the sale, it can
be used to expand the seller's holding period so as to qualify for long-
term capital gain.8 3 In addition, an escrow can be used to shift a
sale from one year to another, provided a business purpose can be
shown. Where such a purpose is absent, the taxpayer faces the possi-
bility of having the escrow characterized as a sham.'
In using an escrow arrangement for deferment, the parties must
consider its ancillary effects, such as any additional costs involved,
and the possibility of having the sale fall through. Another impor-
tant element that must be considered in deciding whether to use an
179. See generally Koch v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 71 (1976); Estate of Franklin v. Com-
missioner, 64 T.C. 752 (1975), aff'd, 544 F.2d 1045, 38 A.F.T.R.2d 76-6164 (9th Cir. 1976);
Note, The Effect of Escrow Arrangements on Federal Income Tax Liability, 59 HARV. L. REV.
1292 (1946); see also Rev. Proc. 76-26, 1976-2 C.B. 643 (conditional escrow of shares pursuant
to a tender offer); Bogaard, Corporate Reorganizations, 2 J. CORP. TAX 377 (1975).
180. See Dyke v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1134 (1946).
181. Merrill v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 66 (1963), aff'd per curiam, 336 F.2d 771, 14
A.F.T.R.2d 5703 (9th Cir. 1964); Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
675 (1961); Dyke v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1134 (1946); The Effect of Escrow Arrangements
on Federal Income Tax Liability, supra note 179. See also Rev. Rul. 75-563, 1975-2 C.B. 199,
200; Rev. Rul. 71-265, 1971-1 C.B. 223.
182. See Rev. Rul. 75-563, 1975-2 C.B. 199.
183. First Am. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 902, 10 A.F.T.R.2d 5650 (M.D.
Tenn. 1962); Watson v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (P-H) 308 (1949). But see Howell v. Com-
missioner, 140 F.2d 765, 31 A.F.T.R. 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 735 (1944). See
generally Estes, supra note 169; Hoffman, How to Freeze Stock-Trading Profits, Get Capital
Gain, with a Call and Short Sale, 16 J. TAX. 110 (1962); Sultan, supra note 155.
184. See Dyke v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1134 (1946).
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escrowee is the determination of who will be taxable on any income
generated from the property held in escrow. Generally this is cov-
ered in the agreement. Where, however, the agreement is silent, the
party who finally receives the income is taxable on it, either in the
year it is received or the year in which all rights to it become fixed.""'
The party entitled to the income need not be the party with the
right to the property. Since the escrow agent merely is a stake-
holder, he realizes no taxable income from the property.
D. Options To Buy or Sell
In the case of an option covered by section 1234,186 section 1234(b)
(1) provides that gain or loss from a closing transaction with respect
to, and gain on the lapse of, such an option shall be treated as gain
or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for less than
one year.'7
V. MECHANICS OF THE TAX
A. In General
Capital gains and losses are divided by the holding period into
two categories, long- and short-term. Long-term capital gains
(LTCG) are taxed at a lower rate than that applicable to ordinary
income and to short-term capital gains (STCG). This favorable
treatment of capital gains is distinguished from the unfavorable
capital loss treatment: long- and short-term capital losses (LTCL
and STCL) are restricted in their ability to offset ordinary income.
B. Noncorporate Taxpayers
Once all of the taxpayer's capital transactions are separated from
the ordinary transactions, the long-term gains and losses and the
short-term gains and losses must be netted within their respective
categories. The net of the short-term transactions will be either a
net short-term gain or a net short-term loss.' 8 8 Similarly, the net of
the long-term transactions will be either a net long-term gain or a
net long-term loss.' 8 If the net short-term capital gains exceed the
185. Chaplin v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 298, 31 A.F.T.R. 124 (9th Cir. 1943); Rev. Rul.
70-567, 1970-2 C.B. 133; Barton, Taxation of Interim Income in Agreements of Sale, in
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL OF LAW TENTH ANNUAL TAX INSTITUTE 689 (J.
Ervin ed. 1958).
186. See Part One, supra note 2, section II.E. for further discussion of options to buy and
sell.
187. See also Estes, supra note 169.
188. I.R.C. § 1222(5)-(6).
189. Id. § 1222(7)-(8).
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net short-term capital losses, the excess is taxable in full at ordinary
income rates.
Where the net long-term capital gains exceed the net short-term
capital losses, section 1202 provides that individual taxpayers may
deduct sixty percent of the excess from gross income: the full
amount of the excess is included in gross income, but sixty percent
is excluded from adjusted gross income."9 As a result, the exclusion
has the same effect as applying only two-fifths of the taxpayer's
highest marginal rate to the entire gain. Generally, therefore, the
highest rate at which long-term capital gains will be taxed is
twenty-eight percent-two-fifths the maximum tax rate of seventy
percent.'
1. Net Long-Term or Short-Term Capital Loss Only
Where the taxpayer has only a net long-term capital loss, section
1211(b) provides that one-half of it (up to $3,000) is applied against
ordinary income. " ' Any excess of the long-term capital loss from
that actually applied against gross income for the principal taxable
year becomes a long-term capital loss carryover under section
1212(b), whereby up to $6,000 will be applied to the next taxable
year. 9 3 If the taxpayer has only a net short-term capital loss, how-
ever, up to $3,000 of that loss may be applied in full against ordinary
income; any excess becomes a short-term capital loss carryover to
future years. There is no limit on the number of years to which an
individual's capital losses may be carried forward, but they may not
be carried back to a prior year.
Subject to some significant differences, both long- and short-term
capital losses are treated similarly in that each may offset ordinary
income. Under section 1211 (b) (1) (C) (i) short-term losses offset ordi-
190. Previously, the deduction from gross income was 50%. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §
117(b), 53 Stat. 47 (1939). The Revenue Act of 1978 increased the deduction for transactions
occurring after October 1978 to 60%. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
191. The only instances in which the 28% maximum rate will be deviated from are those
which result from application of I.R.C. §§ 56, 57, 58-the Minimum Tax for Tax Prefer-
ences-which may increase the maximum rate slightly. The minimum tax was amended by
the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 421, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978) by the addition to
the Code of I.R.C. § 55-the Alternative Minimum Tax-effective beginning 1979.
Noncorporate taxpayers formerly had available to them the alternative tax of I.R.C. §
1201(b). Applied to the taxpayer as three separate, partial taxes, it basically resulted in a
flat 25% rate on the first $50,000 of net long-term capital gain. This noncorporate alternative
rate never produced more than a $500 tax saving, and this amount could be realized only by
higher-bracket taxpayers. It was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §
401(a), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978). The alternative tax for corporate taxpayers-I.R.C. §
1201(a)-still exists.
192. I.R.C. § 1211(b)(2)(B).
193. Id. § 1212(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
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nary income dollar for dollar; under section 1211(b)(1)(C)(ii), two
dollars of long-term loss are needed to offset one dollar of ordinary
income. Section 1202(b)(2) requires that short-term losses be offset
prior to the offset of any long-term loss. This two-to-one ratio of
long-term losses to ordinary income, which was enacted in 1969,111
is intended to counter the special treatment accorded long-term
capital gains whereby three dollars of gain are taxed like two dollars
of ordinary income.
2. Net Long-Term and Short-Term Losses
Where the taxpayer has both net long-term and net short-term
capital losses, one-half of the long-term loss is combined with the
short-term loss for application against up to $3,000 of ordinary in-
come. Any excess losses are computed under section 1212(b) for
purposes of the carryover. When the losses are carried over, they
retain their respective characterization as either long- or short-term.
3. Net Long-Term Gain over Short-Term Loss
If the net long-term capital gain exceeds the net short-term capi-
tal loss, the procedure described previously in section VA. is fol-
lowed. The only change is that in determining the section 1202
deduction, the taxpayer will use the excess of the net long-term
capital gain over the net short-term capital loss. Conversely, if the
net short-term loss exceeds the net long-term gain, the gain is elimi-
nated, and any excess loss is applied against the $3,000 of ordinary
income in accordance with section 1211(b). Any further short-term
capital loss is carried over under section 1212(b).
4. Net Long-Term Loss over Short-Term Gain
Where the net long-term capital loss exceeds the short-term gain,
the gain is eliminated. One-half of any remaining loss is applied to
$3,000 of ordinary income. Any remaining loss (over $6,000) is car-
ried over under section 1212(b) to subsequent years as long-term
capital loss. However, if the short-term gain exceeds the long-term
loss, the excess is taxed along with ordinary income at the applica-
ble section 1 rates.
C. Corporate Taxpayers
The same netting process which applies to noncorporate taxpay-
ers must be used to determine the net gains and losses of corporate
194. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 513(a), 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
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taxpayers. Additionally, they are accorded similar preferential tax
treatment for long-term capital gains by the section 1201 alternative
tax. Corporate taxpayers are not entitled to the section 1202 deduc-
tion used by their noncorporate counterparts.
The alternative tax is twenty-eight percent of the entire excess of
net long-term gain over net short-term capital loss.'
5 However, in
many instances the alternative tax will not be used because the
section 11 corporate tax rate will be less than twenty-eight percent.
In addition, the alternative tax applies only to net long-term gains;
net short-term gains are taxed at ordinary rates.
Under section 1211, corporations may offset capital losses only
against capital gains. Corporate capital losses can be carried back
three years, and carried over five years, but only as short-term capi-
tal losses. Losses must be carried back to the earliest year allowable
and then carried forward until either they are exhausted or the time
expires.
195. Prior to 1979, the corporate alternative tax rate was 30%. The Revenue Act of 1978
reduced it to 28%. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
